





Working Group on Risk "Market Risk Modeling after Basel III : New Challenges for Banks and Supervisor.

Jeudi 23 Mars 2017 12h45 Paris La Défense

Jean-Paul Laurent, Univ. Paris 1 Panthéon – Sorbonne, PRISM & Labex Refi Joint work with Hassan Omidi Firouzi, Royal Bank of Canada, formerly at Labex Refi Market Risk Modelling after Basel III: New Challenges for Banks and Supervisors

- Market risks: regulatory outlook
- The rise of historical simulation
- Backtesting and VaR exceptions
- Pointwise volatility estimation: The conundrum
- Assessment of risk models under Basel III
 - Limited usefulness of econometric techniques
 - Hypothetical Portfolio Exercises challenged?
 - Lower decay factors to mitigate disruptions in the computation of Risk Weighted Assets?

Key messages for regulation

Hidden impacts of risk modelling choices on financial stability and pro-cyclicality under Basel III FRTB

Even when considering simple exposures (S&P500)

- And complexity (optional products, correlations) left aside
- Basel backtests poorly discriminates among models

Danielsson (2002), Danielsson et al (2016)

Focus on VaR exceptions over past year! Minsky moment

Benchmarking on hypothetical portfolios (EBA, 2017)

Unstable ranking of risk models calls for proper averaging

Promote smart model risk supervision and enhanced disclosure on risk methodologies

Ongoing ECB TRIM

Messages for market risk managers

- Favour Volatility Weighted Historical Simulation (VWHS) over Historical Simulation (HS) for VaR/ES computations
- Historical Simulation works poorly in stressed periods
 - Backtesting over current period is useless!
 - Procyclicality: patterns of VaR exceptions under stress and fall-back to costly Standard Approach
- Implementing Volatility Weighted Historical Simulation
 - Consider smaller values of decay factor than .94 Riskmetrics
 - Does not lead to extra-capital charges: Basel III capital metrics based on stressed period only
 - Endogenous stressed period does not depend upon choice of decay factor
 - Lower number of exceptions under stress: greater resilience

Internal Models Approach (IMA) still applicable

- Stringent constraints on data (modellable risk factors) and processes (P&L eligibility tests)
- + backtesting at desk level requirements
- IMA based on 97.5% Stressed Expected Shortfall (ES)
 - liquidity horizons : 10 days or more
 - No scaling from 1D to 10D (<u>Danielsson & Zigrand</u> (2006))
 - IY stressed period endogeneously computed
 - Is model dependent, but in our case study example, was found to be mid June 2008 – mid June 2009

Market Risk Weighted Assets (RWA): Basel III regulatory outlook

- Minimum capital requirements for market risk (January 2016)
 - ▶ FRTB: Fundamental Review of the Trading Book
 - Implementation delayed to 2019
- 2016 monitoring exercise: increase of 75% of RWA compared with Basel 2.5
- Bank struggling with operational issues
 - Data quality: Non Modellable Risk Factors (NMRF)
 - Alignment between risk and front office models
 - To a lesser extent, compliance with backtesting requirements
 - Market risk RWA might be further inflated...

Basel III regulatory outlook: Market Risk Group reopened in 2017


Desk eligibility to internal models?

- Threat of fallback to costly Standard Approach
- According to ISDA could lead to x6 increase for FX and x4 increase for equity desks
- Questions the calibration of risk weights in the Standard Approach
- Non Modellable Risk Factors (NMRF) charge
 - Roughly one third of IMA, but large ongoing variability and uncertainty
 - Could be dramatically reduced if banks to use settlement prices in collateral agreements

Market Risk Weighted Assets (RWA): EU regulatory outlook

- EU CRR-2 (November 2016)
 - Differences on key points with Basel document
 - Restricted scope of modellable risk factors (MRF)
 - Slightly different backtesting constraints
 - EBA Technical Standards to be issued in 2021
 - Eligibility to Internal Models Approach...
- ECB TRIM (Targeted Review of Internal Models)
 - Still Basel 2.5, but not innocuous regarding pricing models and VaR methodologies
- Impact of ongoing deregulation in the US?

- Hypothetical Profit and Loss (HPL)
 - Banks holdings frozen over risk horizon
 - « Uncontaminated P&L »: not accounting for banks' fees (<u>Frésard et al.</u> (2011)).
 - Computed according to all risk factors and pricing tools being used by Front Office (FO)
 - full revaluation is implicit when computing hypothetical P&L
- Backtesting: compare 1 day VaR with daily HPL and daily actual Profit and Loss (P&L)



- Backtesting based on 97.5% and 99% 1 day VaR
 - Not directly on ES as in <u>Du & Escanciano</u> (2016)
 - Number of VaR exceptions is the max of number of VaR exceptions computed using HPL and number of VaR exceptions using actual P&L (over past year)
 - Allowance for up to 12 breaches for 99% VaR and 30 breaches for 97.5% VaR
 - At trading desk level: <u>Danciulescu</u> (2010), <u>Wied et</u> <u>al.</u> (2015)
 - BCBS QIS and monitoring exercises also requests reporting of 1D 97.5% ES + p -values

- Desk eligibility to IMA (Internal Model
 - Risk-theoretical P&L (RTPL)
 - Changes in P&L according to bank's internal risk model
 - Use of modellable risk factors within risk systems (FRTB/Basel 3)
 - Mapped from risk factors used in Front Office
 - Delta/gamma approximations, PV grids or full revaluation might be used in repricing books
 - Definition of RTPL is subject to controversy and needs to be clarified


Desk not eligible to IMA if HPL and RTPL are too distant (criteria under scrutiny)

Huge litterature relarted to VaR/ES computations


- Historical, FHS, VWHS, EWMA, Parametric (multivariate Gaussian), GARCH family, EVT, <u>CAViaR</u>, ...
 - To quote a few: Kupiec (1995) Hendricks (1996), Christoffersen (1998), Berkowitz (2001), Berkowitz, & O'Brien (2002), Yamai & Yoshiba (2002) Kerkhof & Melenberg (2004), Yamai & Yoshiba (2005), Campbell (2006), Hurlin & Tokpavi (2008), Alexander (2009), Candelon et al. (2010), Wong (2010), BCBS (2011), Rossignolo et al. (2012), Rossignolo et al. (2013), Abad et al. (2014), Ziggel et al. (2014) Krämer & Wied (2015). Siburg et al. (2015), Pelletier & Wei (2015), Nieto & Ruiz (2016)

Backtesting performance?

- Lack of implementation details, choice of backtest portfolios, historical periods make comparisons difficult
- Dealing with operational issues is also of importance
 - large dimensionality: several thousands of risk factors,
 - Costly to price optional products,
 - Data requirements.




From <u>Perignon & Smith</u> (2010) based on 2005 data



1 Banks are deemed to use the sensitivities approach if they use it exclusively, hybrid if they use it at least 30 percent of the time, and full revaluation if less than 30 percent. Source: McKinsey Market Risk Survey and Benchmarking 2011

Mehta et al (2012)



EBA (2017) benchmarking exercise conducted over a (heterogeneous) panel of 50 banks with approved internal models

Volatility Weighted Historical Simulation (VWHS)

▶ <u>Hull & White</u> (1998), <u>Barone-Adesi et al.</u> (1999)

Volatility not constant over VaR estimation period

Rescale returns by ratio of current volatility to past volatility

 $\triangleright \sigma_t$ volatility at time t, r_{t-h} return at t - h

Rescaled past returns $\frac{\sigma_t}{\sigma_{t-h}} \times r_{t-h}$

VWHS: empirical quantile of rescaled returns

▶ (Location) scale models: $r_t = \sigma_t \times \varepsilon_t$

GARCH: ε_t has a given stationary distribution

Such as t(v): parametric approach to ε_t

 $\blacktriangleright \text{VaR:} q_{\alpha}(r_t) = \sigma_t \times q_{\alpha}(\varepsilon_t)$

EVT could be used to assess q_α(ε_t), <u>McNeil & Frey</u> (2000), <u>Diebold et al.</u> (2000), <u>Jalal & Rockinger</u> (2008)


VWHS: same approach to VaR

- ► BUT $q_{\alpha}(\varepsilon_t)$ empirical quantile of standardised returns r_t/σ_t
- Above decomposition shows two sources of model risk: volatility estimation σ_t, tails of standardized returns ε_t

Practical implementation of VWHS


- Standardised returns $\varepsilon_t = r_t / \sigma_t$ not directly observed
- Since ε_t depends on **unobserved** volatility σ_t
- **b** Large uncertainty when deriving σ_t
- Specific additional issues with GARCH(1,1) modelling: <u>Pritsker</u> (2006)
 - Misspecification of ε_t distribution?
 - ► Tail dynamics only driven by volatility σ_t

$(Var1\%/VaR2.5\%)/(\Phi^{-1}(99\%)/\Phi^{-1}(97.5\%))$ EWMA volatility estimates, decay factor = .8



For Gaussian \mathcal{E}_t and well-specified decay factor, ratio should be equal to one Ratio higher than 1 means fat tails $(Var1\%/VaR2.5\%)/(\Phi^{-1}(99\%)/\Phi^{-1}(97.5\%))$ EWMA volatility estimates, decay factor = .8

 $\varepsilon_t = r_t / \sigma_t$ show some left tail dynamics.



Backtesting and VaR exceptions

Basel III regulatory reporting

- 10 days Expected Shortfall (capital requirement)
 - Computed over different subsets of risk factors (partial ES), scaled-up to various time horizons
 - Computed over stressed period, averaged and submitted to multiplier (in between 1.5 and 2)

Computation of 10D ES from daily data and VWHS: <u>Giannopoulos & Tunaru</u> (2005), <u>Righi & Ceretta</u> (2015)

1 day 99% and 97.5% VaR (backtesting)

$$\bullet q_{99}(r_t) = \sigma_t \times q_{99}(\varepsilon_t)$$
$$\bullet q_{97.5}(r_t) = \sigma_t \times q_{97.5}(\varepsilon_t)$$

Backtesting and VaR exceptions

- VaR exception: whenever loss exceeds VaR
- For 250 trading days and 1% VaR, average number of VaR exceptions = 2.5
- For well-specified VaR model, number of VaR exceptions follows a Binomial distribution
 - So-called « unconditional coverage ratios » or traffic light approach (<u>Kupiec</u>, 1995, Basel III, 2016)
- Regulatory thresholds at bank's level: green zone, up to 4 exceptions, yellow zone, in between 5 and 9 exceptions, red zone, 10 or above
- At desk level: 12 exceptions at 1%, 30 at 2.5%



Volatily Weigthed Historical Simulation outperforms Historical Simulation

Number of VaR exceptions over past 10 years (S&P 500)

	1% VaR	2,5% VaR
Historical Simulation	40	89
Volatility Weighted Historical Simulation (RiskMetrics)	26	68
Expected	25	63

- EWMA (Exponentially Weighted Moving Average)
- $\blacktriangleright \sigma_t^2 = \lambda \times \sigma_{t-1}^2 + (1 \lambda) \times r_t^2$
- > λ : decay factor, 1λ speed at which new returns are taken into account for pointwise volatility estimation
 - ► RiskMetrics (1996), $\lambda = 0.94 \ll \text{Golden number} \gg$
 - Single parameter model
- EWMA is a special case of GARCH(1,1)
 - With no mean reversion of volatility.
 - ► σ_t^2 is not floored and becomes quite close to zero in calm periods (<u>Murphy et al.</u> (2014))

- > Numerous techniques to estimate decay factor λ
- RiskMetrics (1996): minimizing the average squared error on variance estimation

$$\hat{\lambda} = \underset{\lambda \in (0,1)}{\arg\min} \frac{1}{T} \sum_{i=1}^{T} [\sigma_i^2(\lambda) - r_i^2]^2$$

Other approaches:


- Guermat & Harris (2002) to cope with non Gaussian returns
- Pseudo likelihood: Fan & Gu (2003)
- Minimization of check-loss function: <u>González-Rivera et al.</u> (2007)

- For S&P500, Estimates of decay factor are highly unstable and could range from 0.8 to 0.98 wild around the 0.94 RiskMetrics « golden number »
 - Note that $\lambda = 1$ corresponds to plain HS


Estimation method/ length of historical data	10 years	First 5 years	Second 5 years
Squared error method	0.8992854	0.8207192	0.9030331
Pseudo likelihood method	0.9331466	0.9525935	0.9146936
Check loss method at 1% level	0.9010942	0.9406649	0.8398029
Check loss method at 2.5% level	0.8829908	0.9557358	0.8634209

 Building volatility filters is even more intricate when considering different risk factors (<u>Davé & Stahl</u> (1998))

- ► Lopez (2001), Christoffersen & Diebold (2000), Angelidis et al. (2007), Gurrola-Perez & Murphy (2015) point out the issues with determining σ_t
- Recall that high values of λ results in slower updates of VaR when volatility increases
 - Murphy et al. (2014) suggest that CCPs typically use high values (.99) for decay factor.
 - In case of Poisson type event risk (no memory), higher values of λ would be a better choice.
 - \blacktriangleright No obvious way to decide about the optimal λ



Assessment of VaR (risk) models



Assessment of risk models

Number of VaR Exceptions over past 10 years (S&P 500)

	1% VaR	2,5% VaR
$\begin{array}{c} VWHS \\ \lambda = 0.8 \end{array}$	28	68
$VWHS \\ \lambda = 0.94 \\ (RiskMetrics)$	26	68
Expected	25	63

Almost same results for tests based on number of VaR exceptions (unconditional coverage)

Assessment of risk models

Number of VaR Exceptions over the one year stressed period


	1% VaR	2,5% VaR
$\begin{array}{c} VWHS \\ \lambda = 0.8 \end{array}$	1	5
$VWHS \\ \lambda = 0.94 \\ (RiskMetrics)$	6	10
Expected	2.5	6

- Smaller decay factors imply prompter VaR increases when volatility rises and better behaviour during stressed period
- Similar results in <u>Boucher et al.</u> (2014), where plain HS (λ = 1) provides poor results under stress. See also <u>O'Brien & Szerszen</u> (2014).


Assessment of risk models

- PIT (Probability Integral Transform) adequacy tests
 - Crnkovic and Drachman (1995), <u>Diebold et al.</u> (1997), <u>Berkowitz</u> (2001)
- Basel Committee Monitoring Exercises
 - Check whether the loss distribution (instead of a single quantile) is well predicted.
 - ▶ If F_t is the well-specified (predicted) conditional loss distribution, F_t(r_{t+1})~U[0,1]
 - ▶ $F_t(r_{t+1}) : p$ -values


PIT adequacy tests



PIT adequacy tests




Focusing on tails: VWHS vs plain HS



Expected values: 25 exceptions at 1% level, 38 in between 1% and 2.5%:good fit with VWHS

Hurlin & Tokpavi (2006), <u>Pérignon & Smith</u> (2008), <u>Leccadito, Boffelli, & Urga</u> (2014). <u>Colletaz et al.</u> (2016) for more on the use of different confidence internals

Focusing on tails: VWHS vs plain HS




Expected values: 25 exceptions at 1% level, 38 in between 1% and 2.5%:bad fit with HS

- Clustering of VaR exceptions, i.e. several blows in a row might knock-out bank's capital
- Are VaR exceptions clustered during stressed periods?
 - "We are seeing things that were 25-standard deviation moves, several days in a row"
 - Quoted from David Viniar, Goldman Sachs CFO, August 2007 in the Financial Times
 - Crotty (2009), <u>Danielsson</u> (2008), <u>Dowd</u> (2009), <u>Dowd</u> et al. (2011)

Tests based on duration between VaR exceptions

Christoffersen & Pelletier (2004), Haas (2005), Candelon et al. (2010)

Overshoots for VaR exceptions using VWHS and lambda=.8 at 1% confidence level



Conditional coverage tests

- $I_t = 1,0$ depending on occurrence of an exception
- $\blacktriangleright E_t[I_{t+1}] = 1\%, 2.5\%$
 - $\blacktriangleright E_t$ conditional expectation
- Conditional probability of VaR exception consistent with confidence level
 - Engle & Manganelli (2004), Berkowitz et al. (2008), Cenesizoglu & Timmermann (2008), Gaglianone et al. (2012), Dumitrescu et al. (2012), White et al. (2015).
- Instrumental variables: past VaR exceptions and current + past level of the VIX volatility index

Leads to GMM type approach

$$I_t = \alpha_0 + \sum_{i=1}^{I} \alpha_i I_{t-i} + \sum_{j=0}^{K} \beta_j V I X_{t-j} + u_t$$

Engle & Manganelli (2004)

▶ VaR model is well-specified if $\alpha_0 = 1\%$, 2.5% and $\beta_j = 0$, $\alpha_i = 0$, $i \ge 1$

We rather follow the logistic regression approach

Berkowitz et al. (2008)

- Choosing number of lags I, K is uneasy
 - Number of lags depend on confidence level
 - And considered portfolio/trading desk
 - Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC), backward model selection, partial autocorrelation function (PACF) are not discriminant

Results for S&P500 2.5% confidence level

Red cells are acceptable: no lag for VIX, but lags 2,3,4 or (3,4) for I_{t-i} could be considered

GMM model	(1 0)	(1 1)	(1 2)	(2 0)	(2 1)	(2 2)
BIC	67.18	72.25	69.70	65.07	70.21	67.80
GMM model	(3 0)	(3 1)	(3 2)	(4 0)	(4 1)	(4 2)
BIC	65.07	70.16	67.71	65.07	70.14	67.56
GMM model	(1,2 0)	(1, 2 1)	(1, 2 2)	(2, 3 0)	(2, 3 1)	(2, 3 2)
BIC	70.33	75.44	73.02	67.86	73.08	70.66
GMM model	(3, 4 0)	(3, 4 1)	(3, 4 2)	(1, 3 0)	(1, 3 1)	(1, 3 2)
BIC	67.86	73.01	70.43	69.97	75.05	72.73

▶ Preliminary results suggests that $\lambda \leq 0.9$

► Would reject $\lambda = 0.94$ (Riskmetrics standard)

Parameters (two regressors, I_{t-3}, I_{t-4})	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
α_0	-4.0561	0.5043	-8.043	$8.77e - 16^{***}$
α_3	2.4467	1.2060	2.029	0.0425^{*}
α_4	2.4467	1.2060	2.029	0.0425^{*}

But results of statistical tests are difficult to interpret (depend on the chosen lags)

Rejection for lags (3,4) acceptance for lag 3 only

Parameters (one regressor, I_{t-3})	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	Pr(> z)
$lpha_0$	-3.8544	0.4519	-8.529	$< 2e - 16^{***}$
α_3	2.2450	1.1850	1.894	0.0582°
			/	

Estimation results based on March 2008 to February 2009 daily data

- Vast litterature on model risk due to parameter uncertainty, choice of estimation method.
 - Christoffersen & Gonçalves (2005), Alexander & Sarabia (2012), Escanciano & Olmo (2012), Escanciano & Pei (2012), Gourieroux & Zakoïan (2013), Boucher & Maillet (2013), Boucher et al. (2014), Danielsson & Zhou (2015), Francq, & Zakoïan (2015), Danielsson, et al. (2016).

Our focus is more narrow: concentrate on a key parameter left in the shadow, i.e. decay factor, and implications for risk management under Basel III

> Recall that Historical Simulation, EWMA/Riskmetrics and FHS/VWHS are quite different

Tackling RWA (Risk Weighted Assets) variability

VaR models with strinkingly different outputs would not fail backtests

Not new! But what to do with this?

- This can feed suspicion on internal models
 - Hidden model complexity, tweaked RWAs?
 - Standardized Basel III risk models
 - Floors based on Hypothetical Portfolios Exercises

Floors based on Hypothetical Portfolio Exercises (HPE)?

- Basel 2013 RCAP (Regulatory Consistency Assessment Programme) <u>BCBS240</u>, <u>BCBS267</u> & <u>EBA</u> (2013), EBA(2017) show large variations across banks regarding VaR outputs for hypothetical portfolios
 - Partly related to discrepancies under various jurisdictions
 - Partly due to modelling choices
 - Lenght of data sample to estimate VaR, relative weights on dates in filtered historical simulation
 - And as shown in our study HS vs VWHS

EBA (2017) benchmarking exercise

- (Heterogeneous) sample of 50 banks with approved internal models
- On the right, outcome of 99% (current) VaR over 10 days horizon
- Equity index futures trade on FTSE 100
- 41 respondent banks
- How can we analyse variation across banks?

200%


100%

0%

EBA (2017) benchmarking exercise: Reasons for discrepancies between internal models

- Poor contributions to the benchmarking exercise!
- Differences in averaging:
 - over two weeks but either with daily or weekly data depending on banks
- Valuation issues for more exotic trades
 - Which model has been used ? full revaluation, approximations made in Risk models
 - Not applicable in disclosed hypothetical portfolio
- Differences in methodologies


Differences in methodologies



Length of observations: x = 1 year
1 year < x<= 2 years
2 years <x<= 3 years
x> 3 years


Longer computational period similar to higher decay factor

Differences in methodologies



Most banks in the panel use plain HS (decay factor = 1)

Differences in methodologies



- 1 day re-scaled to 10 days
- 10 days with overlapping periods
- 10 days other methodology

Use of scaling to cope with 10D horizon

Floors based on Hypothetical Portfolio Exercises (HPE)?

- Our controlled experiment shows that ranking of models varies dramatically through time
 - Model A can much more conservative than model B one day, the converse could be observed next day
 - Though in average models A and B provide the same VaRs
- This is problematic regarding the interpretation of HPE and RWA variability
 - Above approach would favour the use of the same possibly misspecified 0.94 golden number...

Tweaking internal models?

Strategic/opportunistic choice of decay factor?

- Danielsson (2002), <u>Pérignon et al.</u> (2008), <u>Pérignon & Smith</u> (2010), <u>Colliard</u> (2014), <u>Mariathasan & Merrouche</u> (2014)
- Sticky choice of decay factor: supervisory process
- Does not change average capital requirements
- Could change the pattern of VaR dynamics
 - Higher decay factor leads to smoother patterns and ease management (risk limits)
 - Regulatory capital requirements are based on stressed period only and on averages over past 60 days
 - No procyclicality issue with using smaller decay factors

Undue internal model complexity?

Haldane and Madouros (2012), Dowd (2016) tackle undue model complexity

Our approach is simple and widely documented

- No correlation modelling or pricing models of exotic produts is involved
- No sophisticated econometric methods
- However, HS can be fine tuned
- Making things simpler (Standard Approaches, output floors based on SA, leverage ratio) might reduce risk sensitivity

Traps in market risk capital requirements

- Procyclical trap when using today's risk models
 - Ratio of IMA to SA quite large in a number of cases
 - Plain historical simulation or use Riskmetrics decay factor results in large number of VaR exceptions under stress and fallback to SA
 - If a IMA desk is disqualified, huge increase in capital requirements
 - Issue not foreseen: QIS are related to a calm period
 - Use of outfloors based on a percentage of SA would not solve above issue

Traps in market risk capital requirements

Avoiding the procyclical trap

- Using lower values of decay factor for prompter updates in volatility prediction
- Smaller number of VaR exceptions in volatile periods
- Resilience of internal models against market tantrum
- Managing reputation (see above Goldman's case study)
- Lowering decay factor should not increase capital requirements
 - No bias in average variance estimates
 - ES computed on a stressed period only + averaging

Traps in market risk capital requirements

Avoiding the FRTB procyclical trap?

- Banks are currently faced with other top priorities regarding desk eligilibility to IMA
 - Data management to reduce NMRF scope
 - PnL attribution tests: reconciliation of risk and front office risk representations and pricing tools, dealing with reserves and fair value adjustements
 - Threshold number of VaR exceptions at desk level is high.
- BUT large number of desks (100?) and local or global market tantrums might be devastating

Forget about unfrequent recalibration of risk models!

Conclusion

Focus on decay factor impacts for risk measurement in the new Basel III setting

Desk-level validation and back-testing

- Beware of plain historical simulation methods and challenge the .94 golden number
 - Further research with internal bank data might prove useful
 - Lower decay factors for dedicated trading desks
- Challenge the outcomes of Hypothetical Portfolio Exercises on RWA variability

- BCBS, 2011. <u>Messages from the Academic Literature on Risk</u> <u>Measurement for the Trading Book.</u>
- Fed, 2011, <u>Supervisory Guidance on Model Risk Management</u>.
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